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and not just of individual lawyers or particular law firms. But the
large law firms, by reason of their tremendous resources and influ-
ence, have a responsibility to provide leadership.
It seems appropriate to say a last word to the students-to the
lawyers of the future. During the era of the counter-culture and
the Viet Nam War, younger lawyers pressed the nation's law firms
to expand the scope of their pro bono activities. Young men and
women who then came to the law firms were intensely interested in
public service activities. When they would apply, they would ask:
"What is the firm doing in the pro bono area? What are my oppor-
tunities going to be in the pro bono area if I join your firm?" They
were interested, of course, in when they were going to be elected
partners, as all new associates are, but they asked those other ques-
tions, too. Those young lawyers exercised an enormous influence
on the law firms of the country.
Regrettably, the interest in public service legal work appears to
have declined among both older and younger lawyers. Many of
the law school graduates who apply to firms such as my own ap-
pear to be indifferent about pro bono work. There have been many
theories advanced to explain this change in attitude. Whatever the
explanation, the young lawyers are not prodding or challenging the
law firms as they once did. I suggest that the large law firms, or at
least a good number of them, will respond to requests and to urg-
ings of the younger lawyers for an opportunity to engage in some
public service legal work. That requires, however, some courage
and initiative on the part of the young lawyers. There are exciting
and challenging things for lawyers to do in many different areas of
our society. Justice Holmes said that "one may live greatly in the
law as elsewhere." He was right.
ETHICS AND THE MEGAFIRM - II
Richard D. Lee*
I.
I would like to add an overlay to the remarks that Mr. Krash
made with regard to the megafirm. Mr. Krash has described very
carefully and very thoughtfully a number of the ethical problems
that are faced by the megafirm. I think there is an additional set of
* Mr. Lee is a Professor of Law, Temple University School of Law; Director of
Professional Development, Baker & McKenzie, 1980-1983; B.A. 1957, Stanford Univer-
sity; J.D. 1960, Yale University.
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complications when, instead of dealing simply with a large firm
that has multiple offices in the United States, you add a foreign or
international component. Let me give you examples of the kind of
problem with which the international megafirm must deal.
First, who is the client? The problem of identifying the client is,
to be sure, also a problem for the domestic law firm. As Mr. Krash
has indicated, we no longer are so fortunate as to have a single
unitary relationship between client and firm. Instead, most large
clients parcel out their work to a number of firms. That process is
multiplied as soon as you deal with international subsidiaries of the
same firm. So it is quite possible for one American or non-Ameri-
can international subsidiary to be represented in Paris by one firm,
in Tokyo by a second firm, and in South America by a third firm.
Assume that we are talking about a client called the ABC Corpo-
ration. The ABC Corporation has a wholly-owned subsidiary. The
subsidiary then also has a sixty percent subsidiary. Now we have
minority shareholders to worry about and must worry about the
duty that we have in representing that client and how much of that
duty is owed to those minority shareholders. Then we add a fifty
percent ownership, a rather typical joint venture arrangement. By
now it is clear that we have a situation where we are not at all sure
who our client is.
We were perhaps originally retained because we did work for the
parent. Now we are representing a joint venture in which the par-
ent has fifty percent interest. Is there going to be a conflict be-
tween the representation of that joint venture and a representation
of the parent? Of course, this problem is exacerbated where, be-
cause of national legislation, the American corporation is only a
forty-nine percent, not a fifty-percent, contributor to the joint
venture.
If we can identify the client, we still must answer such questions
as what kind of a loyalty we have and what to do when our loyalty
is tested by a conflict of concern between local management and
the upstream corporate management, especially when we perceive
that our bread and butter comes from the daily contact with the
local manager. It becomes a serious problem when the manager
suggests that his interests and those of the local subsidiary are at
variance with that of the parent corporation. Who is our client
under those circumstances? And what are our ethical responsibili-
ties, first with regard to identifying the client, and second with re-
gard to a conflict? To whom do we report? From whom do we
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seek guidance? If we are distressed with activities at the local level,
what obligation, if any, do we have to go up the corporate chain?
Second, with regard to the international firm, what standard of
professional competence do we apply? We have assumed in the
national firm that each lawyer involved in the main office and the
branch offices is subject to the same basic set of ethical rules. But
even in the United States that is not a fair assumption. Illinois, for
example, was one of those states that chose to adopt from the
Model Code only the Disciplinary Rules and not the Ethical Con-
siderations. Other states have adopted both. So Illinois, in inter-
preting its rules of competence, will often come up with a different
standard of care for the lawyer than New York, for example. If
you have a partner in the Illinois office and a partner in the New
York office, which standard should apply? You would probably
decide to choose the higher standard. Unfortunately, however,
this choice might be difficult to make, since ethical questions do
not rank themselves neatly.
Now, compound that complexity. Ask yourself what standard is
owed when Partner A in the United States is in partnership with
Partner B somewhere else in the world. Both have a local code of
conduct, and those ethical norms may differ substantially. Now,
you say, we will solve that one by simply telling the partner he has
to observe both. That solution was proposed by the Common Mar-
ket, but it has not been a successful solution.
The Common Market, in trying to deal with lawyers practicing
throughout the Common Market, came up with the following rule,
which I am paraphrasing: The lawyer who is a citizen of a member
state has the right to provide legal services in any other member
state. The lawyer remains subject to the rules of professional con-
duct of his own state but must also comply with the ethical rules of
the host state, especially as to "professional secrecy, relations with
other lawyers, the prohibition of the same lawyer acting for parties
with mutually conflicting interests, and publicity."
Now, take the lawyer in jurisdiction A, where advertising is per-
mitted, and put him in partnership with the lawyer in jurisdiction
B, where advertising is not merely frowned upon but is unethical,
and you have a true international ethical question that, I submit,
has some very difficult solutions. To take the problem one step
further, go outside of the rules governing the lawyer, and look at
the ethical norms of the whole community.
One of the great debates that has gone on with regard to the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act has been the perception on the part
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of the business community in the United States that, whether or
not you agree that the standards imposed by the Act are appropri-
ate in conducting business in the United States, there are a number
of parts of the world where activities which are not merely frowned
upon but which are actually illegal under the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act are considered appropriate. It is quite appropriate to
entertain very lavishly in some parts of the world someone with
whom you are doing business, even if that person is a government
official. That kind of conduct could easily be characterized under
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act as a bribe. And yet, under the
local mores, that would not only be considered appropriate con-
duct, it would be considered necessary, and proper, and ethical
conduct.
Similar problems exist in a number of other areas as well. We
simply do not have one global ethical standard governing how law-
yers should be judged, how business should be conducted, and how
we interact with one another.
II. PRACTICAL SOLUTIONS
As a second part of my comments in reaction to the presentation
today, I will turn to what I believe to be one of the most effective
strategies for dealing with ethical problems in the large firm. Mr.
Krash very ably described the fact that in a firm with 100 or more
partners and 200 or more associates, it is very hard to keep track of
all of them. It is hard enough to keep track of your partners. It is
certainly much harder to keep track of associates with all of their
assignments, especially with thirty of them traveling all over the
world on any given day.
Having posed that problem, I do not think the solution is to
suggest that we should come up with a different set of standards or
a relaxed set of standards for the larger enterprise. I really think
that at the point the firm gets big enough, it needs to worry more
about the daily competence of the lawyers in its firm. I am not
sure where that dividing line is, whether it is at 150 or 200 attor-
neys, but at some point the firm must begin systematically to go
about guaranteeing a high level of competence on the part of all of
those attorneys. I suggest that this can be attacked by a rather
systematic program of in-house training.
As you begin to monitor work assignments, to emphasize regu-
lar evaluations, to organize the substantive knowledge that is
passed on to individual associates, to plan the progression of exper-
iences given the individual lawyer as he or she progresses through
1985]
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the firm from first-day associate to junior partner, you have begun
the process of enhancing the competence of the attorneys in the
firm.
I therefore urge the megafirm to develop a very systematic ap-
proach to the training of its lawyers. I do not mean that training in
the sense of an orientation program for the young attorney as he or
she first arrives at the door of the firm, but a life-long training that
involves a continual reexamination by the individual attorneys of
their competence, of their specialties, of their knowledge of the
current law with regard to all of the matters with which they are
dealing.
We have, under either the Model Code or the new proposed
Model Rules, a high duty of competence as lawyers. It seems to
me the only way we can ensure that high degree of competence,
not merely at the moment of graduation from law school, but
throughout a productive fifty years, is by systematic, ongoing train-
ing within the firm.
ETHICS AND THE MEGAFIRM - III
John P. Heinz*
I. A THEORETICAL VIEW
At a recent conference on large law firms, held at Stanford Uni-
versity, one of the speakers asserted that corporate law firms do "a
lot of dirty work." There was a collective gasp from members of
the audience, and the speaker then said: "Well, let me revise that.
They do a lot of mundane work, and some dirty."
I am not certain what he meant by "dirty work," but I suspect
that his definition would not be limited to clear violations of law or
clear violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility. One of
the problems with defining what is dirty in a large law firm practice
(and this has been hinted at by both of the previous speakers) is
that relatively few disciplinary actions are brought against lawyers
in large firms. A common criticism of the ethical system in the
legal profession is that it tends to consist of rules that are made by
corporate lawyers to be applied against solo practitioners-against
people practicing personal injury law and so forth. It is unclear
whether the relative lack of ethical decisions dealing with corpo-
* Mr. Heinz is a Professor of Law, Northwestern University Law School; Executive
Director, American Bar Foundation; A.B. 1958, Washington University; LL.B. 1962,
Yale University.
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rate lawyers is attributable to a feeling that corporate law firms can
be trusted, a feeling that they will clean up their own houses, or
whether the attitude is that the market will take care of it. If the
proposition is that the market will take care of it, I rather doubt it.
Let me talk, though, about the broader social roles of lawyers as
those roles may relate to lawyers' ethical obligations. Such an ap-
proach is particularly appropriate because of the power of large
law firms as institutions. Corporate law firms, after all, deal with
the distribution of great wealth. They are purported to have signif-
icant influence in Washington and other centers of power.
I would like to contrast the view I cited earlier-the view that
corporate lawyers do "dirty work"-with the theory about the role
of the professions that was advanced by Talcott Parsons. Parsons'
general view was that the growth of the professions over the past
150 years or so enchances social stability. He argued that society
otherwise would have tended to spin apart through centrifugal
force as the differentiation of labor and the specialization of func-
tion tended to create ever more narrow interest groups. Parsons
also argued that the professions, particularly law, were able to
bridge the conflicts among these economic interest groups because
the profession's power was grounded in an "independent knowl-
edge base." That is to say, the professionals have knowledge that
other people in the society need, and that knowledge is relatively
non-political. As a resource for power, knowledge differs in its na-
ture from money or guns. It stands above the fray. The argument,
then, was that this independent power base permits the professions,
and particularly lawyers, to play a mediating role that will tend to
bind the society together.
Some of the writing on lawyers has quite explicitly picked up
this theme from Parsons. The first major book on corporate law-
yers-to this day really the only serious scholarly book on corpo-
rate lawyers-is Erwin Smigel's The Wall Street Lawyer, published
about twenty years ago. In that book, Smigel quoted Parsons' view
characterizing the Wall Street lawyer as, "a kind of buffer between
the illegitimate desires of clients and the social interest." So Smigel
saw lawyers as moderating the views of their clients and moving
the clients' position closer to something like the public interest.
At about the same time that Smigel wrote, Charles Horsky, who
is still practicing law at Covington & Burling in Washington, D.C.,
published a series of lectures under the title, The Washington Law-
yer. In those lectures, Horsky adopted a similar view and said that
the role of the Washington lawyer "is that of principal interpreter
1985]
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between government and private person, explaining to each the
needs, desires and demands of the other" and "seeking to adjust
the conflicts that inevitably arise."
How realistic are these views about the independence of the law-
yer? Each of the views is premised upon the lawyer's possession of
a quality that we might characterize as "autonomy," perhaps even
"moral autonomy"-i.e., that they are able to be independent of
the client and to redirect the private demands of their clients to-
ward some conception of the public interest or the common good.
Now, there is an attack on the legal profession from the left that
is quite different from this Parsons-Smigel-Horsky view, but has in
common with it, somewhat ironically, the idea that lawyers are
autonomous or independent of their clients-or at least the idea
that it is possible for them to be independent. This critique from
the left, however, refers to a different kind of autonomy. It is really
talking about non-involvement. It says that lawyers seek to play
the role of technicians in order to absolve themselves from moral
responsibility. That is, if lawyers can characterize themselves as
being mere instruments of their clients, then they may feel that
they do not have to take responsibility for the consequences of
their actions, particularly the consequences for distributive justice
in the broader society. In somewhat cruder terms, this attack from
the left is the view of the lawyer as whore, that is, the view that
lawyers don't have any commitment. They just do it for the
money.
I disagree with both of these views. I think that most corporate
lawyers are enthusiastic about being in bed with their clients. The
trouble with the Parsons-Smigel-Horsky view in my opinion is
that, though legal knowledge may be arcane so far as the clients are
concerned, there are a great many sellers of that knowledge. No
one lawyer or law firm has sufficient power in the market to be able
to secure independence by withholding access to knowledge or
skills. If the client does not like what this lawyer is giving him, he
can hire another. So I do not think that their knowledge gives
lawyers the kind of autonomy that Parsons and the others follow-
ing him would suggest.
The trouble with the left wing critique is that it assumes that
lawyers see some sort of moral dilemma in the service of corporate
clients. I doubt that is true. Most corporate lawyers probably feel
quite comfortable in the service of their clients. Let me give you
just a little bit of data that will tend to back that up.
My colleague at the American Bar Foundation, Robert Nelson,
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recently completed a major study of large law firms in Chicago.
As a part of that research, he took a random sample of lawyers in
the firms and asked them this question: "Have you ever refused an
assignment or potential work because it was contrary to your per-
sonal values?" He asked that of 222 lawyers. Of those, only thirty-
six, or sixteen percent, said that they had ever refused an assign-
ment or potential work because it was contrary to their personal
values. Of the thirty-six who had refused work at some time dur-
ing the course of their careers, only a dozen had done so more than
once.
Nelson then further inquired about the reasons for the refusals.
Half of them said that they had been based on reasonably clear
violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility-for example,
cases of continuing criminal activity by the client. Most of the
other half were based on the lawyer's disagreement with the cli-
ent's position on a point of principle-that is, for example, unwill-
ingness to defend racial discrimination or serious environmental
pollution. But the vast majority of the lawyers Nelson interviewed
had not perceived any moral issues in the work presented to them.
Of the eighty-four percent of all the respondents who had never
found it necessary to refuse work, almost all said that they had
never been asked to take on any assignment that raised a moral
question.
Were there really no moral questions that came up in their work,
or did they just not perceive them? I think it is quite likely that
lawyers come to identify with their clients over time. When you
work with people closely over a period of several years, and indeed
serve as advocate for their positions, you may come to share their
views and values-even if you did not share them in the first place,
when you entered that line of work.
II. ETHICS AND RECRUITMENT
Let me briefly touch on one other issue. It is quite different from
the issues that have been discussed so far today, but it is something
that is of particular interest to law students and should be of inter-
est to all of us in the profession-the pattern of recruitment by
large law firms. Specifically, the issue is the extent to which the
socio-economic backgrounds of job applicants affect hiring by large
firms.
We all like to think of the legal profession as a meritocracy. Ed
Laumann and I did some research on Chicago lawyers that ex-
amined the relationship between their careers and their social
1985]
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origins. Our data are, unfortunately, now getting out of date. They
were collected in 1975, and I point that out to you because it raises
the question of whether our findings are still valid.
One of the things we looked at was the distribution of lawyers
across different kinds of practice settings-i.e., small firms, large
firms, solo practice, and so on-by their ethno-religious back-
grounds. We found a great deal of ethnic stratification of lawyers.
That is, their ethno-religious backgrounds appeared to influence
the kind of work that they did. Let me give you a specific example.
The most extreme findings were for lawyers who are Jewish. Over-
all, about one-third of the lawyers in Chicago are Jewish, we
found. But in large firms (defined as firms with thirty or more
lawyers) only about seventeen percent were Jewish. So, in other
words, the percent of Jews in large firms was about half the per-
centage in the profession as a whole. The other side of that same
coin is the percentage of Jewish lawyers in solo practice or in small
firms,-i.e. firms with fewer than ten lawyers. There, about forty-
five percent of the lawyers were Jewish. So we found that in the
large firms the percentage of Jews was only about half the overall
percentage, while among solo practitioners and in small firms the
percentage was about half again above the base percentage of a
third of the whole profession.
Maybe that has changed with time. Maybe what we saw in 1975
was the effect of anti-Semitism in the 1930's and 1940's when the
older lawyers entered practice. To test that, we divided our sam-
ple of lawyers into three age groups. We took those that were
forty-six and older, those that were thirty-four to forty-five, and
those that were thirty-three and younger. We then looked again at
the distribution in large firms. What we found was that Jewish
lawyers were under-represented in large law firms in the oldest age
group by seventeen percentage points, in the middle age group by
fifteen percentage points, and in the youngest age group, by ten
percentage points.
Well, it is an improvement. But the under-representation in
even the youngest age group is still significant. And I would sug-
gest to you that it is significant not only in the statistical sense but
in the substantive sense. Maybe that is 1975. Maybe everything is
even better by 1984. Maybe. Maybe it is just Chicago. Maybe
everything is better in other cities. Maybe. I doubt the latter. I
doubt the latter even more than I doubt the former, and I doubt
the former a lot. But I suggest to you that if anti-Semitism,
whether of the lawyers themselves or of their clients, is still influ-
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encing hiring by large firms, then that presents an important ethi-
cal issue of another kind that the profession badly needs to address.
I sometimes think that codes of professional responsibility are a
little like morals legislation-legislation against gambling and
drunkenness and marijuana and so forth. One of Mr. Krash's
mentors was Thurman Arnold-the Arnold of Arnold & Porter.
In "Symbols of Government," back in the mid-1930's, Thurman
Arnold said something to this effect: We have these morals laws
on the books because we want to preserve our moral standards,
and we decline to enforce them because we want to preserve our
conduct. Well, perhaps the same is true of codes of professional
ethics.
QUESTIONS & ANSWERS*
QUESTION: I present this question to Mr. Krash as a representa-
tive of a megafirm. I see a need for separate rules pertaining to the
megafirm, in part because functionally the megafirm is organized
in a fashion different than the private practitioner or the smaller
firm.
MR. KRASH: First, any high-quality large firm seeks to develop
and train its lawyers to assure that they have high professional
standards. And the way in which that is done is by example, by
young lawyers working with older lawyers. I think that most law
firms do a pretty good job of maintaining standards of competence
and professional excellence.
The more difficult question is whether there should be separate
standards for the large law firms. I do not think so. I think that
there has to be one set of standards. In the large law firms, for
example, with the conflict rules, there may be some practical, day-
to-day modifications which reflect the large firm's unique pres-
sures. Similarly, the rules of advertising are modified to the extent
that they are not particularly applicable to the large firms.
We do not have a unitary bar. And it may be that what is an
appropriate set of standards for one group may not be fair and
legitimate for another group. For example, it may be that the fee
relationships for lawyers operating in a ghetto area may require
quite different standards than those needed for lawyers operating
in large law firms who do not have those kind of pressures and
problems. It is possible, however, with a single set of standards,
* The following questions and answers are merely representative of the discussion
that followed the lecture.
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for well-trained young lawyers to learn to handle each unique
problem as it arises. So the real tough question is, how do you
train or educate younger men and women to take affirmative steps
to do other things, like public service.
The best training is by example. The young lawyers should look
to the older lawyers for role models. Hopefully, they see that the
role models are doing public service, and they will follow suit. If
those older lawyers are not doing public service, then the young
lawyer will say, well, you don't have to do that to get ahead so why
should I do it.
Unfortunately, a lot of the older lawyers are not doing some of
these things. One of the reasons they're not doing them, is that the
economic pressures on the partners, especially senior partners, are
simply too great. Also, management responsibility is another fac-
tor which enters into this. In a large law firm, you have tremen-
dous managerial duties which divert your energies. They are just
swallowed up by day-to-day things.
Of course, there are some problems that cannot be dealt with or
prevented by formal education or training. During the Watergate
event, for example, there were people saying, why didn't they have
courses in law schools to teach them not to do certain things? And
my answer to that would be, do you really think you need a course
in law school to teach people that they are not supposed to cheat or
steal or lie? If you have not learned that by the time you attend
law school, do you really believe that the law school is going to
inculcate those virtues? The law school inculcates intellectual vir-
tues, but if you do not have those moral virtues, let me assure you
that no course in legal ethics is going to make you be truthful or
not cheat. That is not what is taught in the law school. It may
teach you what to do in case you have a client who you find is
engaging in a fraud. Then the questions are whom do I tell, how
can I tell, when, and so forth.
In the law firms you can be taught, for example such things as
the proper way to behave to an adversary, the duties toward a tri-
bunal in terms of being candid and truthful, or the proper ways of
responding to discovery requests.
MR. LEE: I would like to take issue with the mentor model that
Abe has recommended as the way of educating. I think the pres-
sures on the partners and the firm as a whole that Abe mentioned
will make the senior partners less able to be role models. Young
associates' starting salaries will continue to rise and the hours
billed in order to justify whose salaries will also increase. This,
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coupled with the efficiencies that are demanded by ever more so-
phisticated clients will reduce the hours that can be passed off as
training. In this climate, I do not think the mentor model is going
to work.
Rather than arguing that they have a different set of standards,
large law firms should instead internalize procedures that will
guarantee the kind of quality control that will ensure the equal
competence of the young lawyer and the not-so-young lawyer.
DEAN APPEL: Mr. Krash, you've given the faculty a good job.
What you are suggesting is a very interesting challenge for law
schools. I think that as educators we must strengthen the resolve
of people coming out of law school to define bono work in the
context of choosing their life's work. I think it is something for us
as a faculty to really begin to wrestle with.
MR. KRASH: Certainly we cannot ask the law schools to assume
an unreasonable burden here. And I don't think the law schools
are to be blamed or are responsible either.
Twenty-five years ago or twenty years ago, what did we mean
when we talked about pro bono work? Usually, we were talking
about representing individual defendants when the forum was a
courtroom, the protagonist was the government, and the issues
dealt with freedom of speech and civil liberties. Then it shifted so
that pro bono work was representing classes or a cause rather than
an individual client, and the forum was often the legislature. Of
course, in talking about representing causes in a large law firm,
there are problems with conflicts. The conflicts problem does not
really occur when representing individuals.
*I think a lot of people have begun to feel that nothing they could
do would make a difference. That has spread through a lot of the
law schools and the community in general. We lost our confidence
in our ability to make a difference.
Any change is going to come from the younger people who come
into the firms. I look around and see a tremendous agenda of un-
finished business in American society where young lawyers could
make tremendous contributions, and those things are not getting
done. Current administration has, for example, cut down the
whole legal services programs, cut the budget, cut back the people.
Whatever foolish things may be said in Washington, the fact re-
mains that there are tremendous needs for legal services to large
segments of the American community. Those needs are not being
met. From everything I hear or know, there are tremendous
problems in the administration of criminal justice. But a lot of the
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young people do not want to work at it. This is a problem we need
to look at carefully.
QUESTION: I think Mr. Heinz implied earlier that members of
large law firms were less challenged in disciplinary complaints than
other lawyers simply because they were with large law firms. I
tend to follow the literature pretty carefully, and I am not aware of
any studies that indicate this.
Most disciplinary complaints are brought against lawyers for
stealing from their clients in one form or another, or for neglecting
their clients' matters. Now I think it is likely that less stealing and
neglect goes on in big firms.
I do not think that fewer complaints are made against lawyers
because of a fear of taking a swing at large law firms. The exam-
ples that Mr. Krash gave when he was talking about conflicts all
involve large law firms. Most of the recent conflicts cases involve
big law firms. Certainly the latest conflicts cases in this circuit all
involve firms of substance, not little guys.
So I do not think big law firms get a pass. If anything, from my
experience practicing in a big firm, I would say that the standards
used in big law firms are at least as good as the model ethical stan-
dards. I see no evidence to the contrary at all.
MR. HEINZ: I don't doubt the latter part for a moment. I think it
is also true, as you said, that there is very little stealing in large law
firms. It is indisputable that the disciplinary cases brought against
large firms are relatively rare exceptions, as your own observation
points out. The vast majority of all disciplinary cases are brought
against solo practicioners and lawyers in very small firms. Only a
very few disciplinary proceedings are brought against lawyers in
larger law firms.
Why is that? I think it's plausible that there may be a higher
standard of ethical conduct in large law firms. But I think there
are other very important structural reasons that may explain that
result as well.
The work that goes on in large law firm practice is a good deal
less visible to other people "outside the family" than is the work
that's done by solo practitioners. A large percent of the work that
solo practitioners do-for example, personal injury lawyers-is
work in court, and litigation is more likely to lead to disciplinary
proceedings than the work that goes on in the office practice in
large firms. Problems that do arise in a large firm may be handled
within the family by various kinds of sanctions-sanctions that are
[Vol. 16
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handled informally. I also would not leave out the possibility that
large law firms have more influence in the organized bar than do
solo practitioners, and thus perhaps also have greater ability to in-
fluence the way in which disciplinary decisions are made than do
solo practitioners.

